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HUMAN PROBLEMS IN ACREAGE REDUCTION

in

T H E S O U T H

(By Calvin B. Hoover)

Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Chester C. Davis, Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, requested Dr. Calvin B. Hoover, Professor of Economics at Duke University and economic adviser in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to make an independent study of the effect of the cotton acreage adjustment program upon the tenant farmer in the South. Mr. Hoover's report is attached.

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HUMAN PROBLEMS IN ACREAGE REDUCTION IN THE SOUTH *

By Calvin B. Hoover

The recovery program has undoubtedly greatly improved conditions in the South. Income obtained from cot ton and other crops is materially higher than it was a year ago, even after allowing for the reduced quantity produced. A substantial revival of buying power and the net reduction in industrial unemployment which has taken place have materially improved the situation. These advantages of the recovery program in the South far outweigh any unfortunate results and individual injustices which have been produced by the acreage reduction program.

The consequence of the existence of certain undesirable effects of the acreage reduction program has naturally been, however, to call the attention of a number of investigators to economic and social conditions in the South. These investigators have often been unfamiliar with the South. They have seen for the first time conditions under which tenant farmers live and they have been shocked by the standard of living which they saw. They have often jumped to the conclusion that the acreage reduction program has been responsible for all undesirable conditions which they found. It is the purpose of the discussion which follows to describe briefly some of the undesirable economic conditions which exist in the South and to analyze the relation of the agricultural adjustment program to them.

I

The problems which affect human beings in the reduction of agricultural production are similar in some respects to those which developed in connection with the reduction in industrial production during the depression. It is

* Since the production of cotton is so predominant in the South, this report confines itself to a discussion of the effects of the cotton acreage reduction program alone.

obvious that if either agricultural or industrial production is reduced, fewer man-hours will be required in production than formerly. The reduction in industrial production which took place from 1929 to the bottom of the depression in 1933 resulted in a tremendous increase in industrial unemployment. The experience of industry warns us against allowing the present acreage reduction program to produce similar unemployment.

Fortunately, a large part of agricultural production is carred on by operators who are not only owners of land and equipment but who are also workers. Consequently, when agricultural production on a farm which is run by an owner-operator is reduced, the result need only be that the owner-operator and his family have shorter working hours than before without reduction in income. If the increase in price of the products raised on such a farm plus payments made by Government to induce the withdrawal of acreage compensates or more than compensates the owner-operator for the lower quantity produced, it is obvious that the owner-operator simply receives a higher money income for reduced hours of labor.

To the extent, however, that production is carried on by a tenant farmer or by a tenant or landowner with the assistance of hired labor, the possibility of conflict of interest between the parties involved arises. It is out of this potential conflict of interest that the most serious of the human problems in acreage reduction in the South arise. The agricultural system in the South is such that these conflicts of interest are bound to arise more frequently than in other parts of the country. This is true, not only because the proportion of tenantry is higher in the South than for the country as a whole, but because the system of tenantry in the South is different from that in use elsewhere.

Cotton requires a very large amount of hand labor in its production. In consequence, the area tilled by each farmer is small and the returns per man hour are low. The fact that production is carried on only for a part of the year also partly accounts for the low return per person employed in the production of cotton. The advantage to the landowner of having a large reserve of cheap labor for use during the cotton-picking season which is furnished by the tenant farmer and his family, has also been a contributing cause for the maintenance of the present tenant system.

There are three main types of tenants in the cotton producing areas of the South. These are cash tenants, share tenants and share croppers. Cash tenants, as the term implies, lease their land either for cash or for a definite number of bales of cotton. Such tenants have a type of tenure that in most respects is similar to that of tenants in other parts of the United States. Share tenants customarily receive three-fourths of the cotton crop and give one-fourth to the landlord as rent, while the division of any grain crop raised is usually in the proportion of two-thirds and one-third. They usually furnish their own work stock and equipment, feed for their livestock and their own food.

Share croppers on the other hand are almost as much agricultural laborers as they are tenant farmers. Customarily they furnish nothing in the production of the crop but their own labor. Work stock, implements, fertilizer, and all other means of production are furnished by the landowner. In addition, it is customary for the share cropper to be "furnished" either credit for the purchase of food or food itself by the landowner for some months of the year. These "furnishings" are deducted from the cropper's share when the cotton is sold. In some cases, share croppers are also charged with miscellaneous items such as payments of debts owed other land-

lords, hoes and hoe files, charges for the use of the landowner's team in moving the tenant's household effects, etc.

It is the custom in some localities to charge an interest rate which is nominally 10% plus an additional service charge of 10% upon the total of all advances including food. If these advances are repaid when the cotton is ginned, the actual rate is much higher than the nominal rate. In seasons when the price of cotton is low, several years may pass during which time the indebtedness of the share cropper accumulates. Interest may or may not be charged for the whole period during which the indebtedness has accumulated. The total of the indebtedness may become so great that there is no motive for continuing to charge interest since there is little possibility of the share cropper being able to repay the total anyhow.

Often the landlord is not repaid a considerable portion of his advances. If a share cropper moves from one plantation to another in the same locality the former landlord may be able to get the new landlord to collect his debt for him. If the share cropper moves out of the locality entirely, the landlord almost certainly will be unable to collect any debt owed him.

During the period of the depression, this system of "furnishing" of share croppers has been a severe drain upon the financial resources of landowners at a time when these financial resources were being severely strained by other factors as well. Thousands of landowners became bankrupt on account of it. It was undoubtedly responsible for throwing large numbers of tenant farmers out of employment when it was no longer possible for the landowner to "furnish" them. It added greatly to the relief burden in the Southern States. The accumulation of the indebtedness of share croppers to landowners during the depression has created serious difficulties in connection with the benefit payments for crop reduction.

Most tenants do not keep an accurate account of the "furnishings" by the landowner. Tenants claim that they are often unable to get a statement of their account from their landlord. Even in the case of landowners who are scrupulously honest, share croppers often think themselves unfairly treated because they fail to remember all the advances which they have received from the landowner and consequently they imagine that the account has been "padded."

It is easy to see the abuses to which such a system is exposed. Share croppers do not customarily have a written lease or rental contract. Their working agreement is an oral one. Often the system of accounts becomes in reality a fiction. Actually, the share cropper receives a very low subsistence wage. This subsistence wage is somewhat lower during bad years and a little higher during good years. All landowners are always under the necessity of adjusting the charges which they make to the ability of the share cropper to pay. In the case of unscrupulous landowners, this amounts to making the charges so high that the share cropper is never out of debt.

The high rate of interest which is charged is one of the heaviest burdens upon the share cropper. Sometimes, however, the landowner is himself the victim of high interest rates. During years in which the price of cotton was high the landowner, the local merchant and the local banker might all benefit from the high rate which the share cropper had to pay on what he was furnished. During years in which the price of cotton has been low the inability of the share cropper to repay the sums expended in "furnishing" him has often ruined landowner, merchant and banker.

This system of "furnishing" by the landlord in connection with the production of a cash crop only and the failure of the share cropper to produce his own food is responsible to a large degree for the generally inadequate diet of many tenant families. It is responsible consequently for the prevalence in certain sections of diseases due to dietary deficiency.

Some landlords no doubt desire the retention of the system of "furnishing" as a means of control over the share cropper. Most tenants also prefer to have the landlord "furnish" them and are unwilling to work for a landlord who does not do so. Gnerations of this system of "furnishing" has produced an incredible degree of irresponsibility in many share croppers. If the share croppers raised a larger proportion of their own foodstuffs, it might be possible to eliminate the system of "furnishing." While some landlords, when the price of cotton was high, were opposed to tenants growing their own foodstuffs, most landlords are now anxious for their tenants to do so, since during the depression the financial burden upon the landlord of the "furnishing" system became almost unbearable. Many share croppers would at first probably be unwilling to raise their own foodstuffs, however, even if given the opportunity since the system has been so deeply ingrained.

II

Various undesirable effects and instances of hardships to individuals have occurred in connection with the cotton acreage reduction program. In some cases these were due to the nature of the cotton contract itself, sometimes to its misinterpretation and sometimes to its violation. These undesirable effects and hardships may be summarized as follows:

1. There have been a considerable number of cases in which tenant farmers have not received the full amount specified by the 1933 cotton contract.

2. The operation of the acreage reduction program creates a motive for reducing the number of tenants on farms. The acreage reduction contracts have within them provisions designed to prevent this motive having effect but the system of enforcement of these provisions has been inadequate.

3. The percentage of the rental payments paid to share tenants and share croppers for land withdrawn from cultivation in accordance with the 1934 cotton contracts is less than in other contracts.

4. The way in which the 1934 cotton contracts have been drawn has produced considerable confusion in the classification of types of tenantry. Upon this classification the division of benefit payments by Government betweent landowner and tenant depends.

The division of the benefits paid by the Government as compensation for cotton plowed up in 1933 was apparently intended to be according to the interests which the landlord and tenant had in the crop, although the contract for that year does not so specifically provide. By the terms of the contract landlords were allowed to sign it both for themselves and for their tenants but only after they had obtained the consent of the tenants. Checks for benefit payments were to be made payable jointly to landlord and tenant unless the tenant waived this right.

In practice, the matter often worked out quite differently. In numbers of cases landlords did not obtain the consent of their tenants before signing the contract. They simply made no mention of having tenants who had an interest in the crop. Consequently, checks for benefit payments were often made out in the name of the landlord alone. He was thus given the opportunity to make any kind of settlement with his tenants which he wished. This situation arose largely due to the failure of the contract to recognize the existence of separate landlord and tenant interests. The contracts do not mention the words "tenant" or "share cropper" and their interests are protected only by reference to "lien holders" and to "all persons who appear to have an interest in the crop."

In a number of cases, share tenants and share croppers were not credited with any part of the so-called option payment of the 1933 contract. In these cases the landlowner obtained the tenant's share of the cotton option payment as well as his own. Serious dissatisfaction often arose among tenants because the landowner deducted from the benefit payments due the tenant the amount of the past indebtedness of the tenant to the landlord. Often these sums were legally due the landlord. In other cases, however, the interest rate which was charged was usurious and at a rate higher than that allowed by the laws of the State in which the parties to the contract lived. Whether the tenant received anything at all often depended upon the charitableness of the landlord. In numberless instances if the landlord had deducted the entire sum which he had a legal right to do, there would have been no net amount received by the tenants at all. What apparently happened was that the deductions amounted sometimes to less than the legal amount due, sometimes to the amount legally due and sometimes to more than the amount legally due, depending upon the charitableness or

unscrupulousness of the landlord. Cases of outright diversion by landlords of benefit payments properly due tenants have been charged. Agents of the Department of Agriculture have investigated and are contiuning to investigate charges of this nature.

The cotton contract of 1934 provides for a benefit payment of 4-1/2¢ per pound upon the amount of cotton which would have been produced upon the acreage which the producer agrees to withdraw from production. 1/

The amount of acreage withdrawn from production is 40% of the average amount of land in cotton production during the past five years. Where the owner of a farm is also the operator, no problem arises in connection with the payment of this 4-1/2¢ per pound of cotton which would have been produced on this acreage. Where a farm is operated by a tenant, however, a difficult problem arises in connection with the division between the landowner and the tenant of the payment for acreage reduction. A cash tenant, by the terms of the contract, receives the entire amount of both the rental payment and and the parity payment. There have been cases, however, in which landowners have drawn new leases with tenants renting for cash, by which tenants have been required to surrender all claims to rental benefits. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration has issued regulations against such practices and has refused to accept contracts from landlords who have made such leases whenever these practices have come to attention.

1/ For technical reasons this payment is divided into a "rental" payment of 3-1/2¢ per pound and a "parity" payment of 1¢ per pound. This parity payment is based upon the farm allotment which is defined as "forty percent (40%) of that figure, expressed in pounds, which results from multiplying the annual average number of acres planted in cotton on this farm during the years 1928-32, inclusive, by the average yield (expressed in pounds) per acres during said years." Since a producer might reduce his acreage in any amount between 35% and 45%, the parity payment might not amount to exactly 1¢ per pound per acre on the acres withdrawn from cultivation. On the average it will do so, however.

The 1934 cotton contract provides in the case of "managing share tenants" that the landowner shall receive one-half of the rental payment and one-fourth of the parity payment, while the tenant receives one-half of the rental payment and three-fourths of the parity payment which the Government makes as compensation for land taken out of cultivation. This means that the landlord receives 2¢ per pound based on the average production of cotton on the acres removed from cultivation while the "managing share tenant" receives 2½¢ per pound. This division is obviously quite fair to this type of tenant. 2/

Much dissatisfaction has arisen in connection with the definition of the term "managing share tenant." No share croppers are included in this category and by no means all share tenants. In the contract a "managing share tenant" is defined as: "A share tenant who furnishes the work stock, equipment and labor used in the production of cotton and who manages the operation of this farm." There have been attempts on the part of landlords to exclude from the category of "managing share tenants" even share tenants who are supervised to no greater extent than an occasional visit by the landlord. As will be explained later, it is in the interest

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2/ It is interesting to compare the payment which the landowner receives from the Government in such a case with the amount of rent which he would ordinarily have received if he had rented the land to a share tenant and there had been no acreage reduction program. The average production of lint cotton is about 174 pounds per acre. It is customary in the case of a share tenant who furnishes almost all the means of production except the land, to pay to the landowner for the use of the land one-fourth of the cotton produced. On the average this would have amounted to 43½ pounds per acre. At the lowest price at which cotton sold during the depression, approximately 5¢ per pound, the landowner would have received $2.17½ for this amount of cotton. With cotton selling at 10¢ per pound, he would have received $4.35. With cotton selling at 15¢ per pound, he would have received $6.52½. (Continued on next page.)

of the landowner to have as few of his tenants as possible included in the category of "managing share tenants." Only cash tenants or "managing share tenants" receive any part of the rental payments. Share croppers receive one-half of the parity payments and share tenants not classed as "managing share tenants" receive three-fourths of the parity payments. The parity payment is so small in the case of the average tenant that is is almost negligible. This means that share croppers receive from the Government 1/2¢ per pound, while the landowner receives 4¢ per pound on the estimated amount of cotton which would have been produced on the land withdrawn from cultivation

This is in contrast with the 1933 contract, by the terms of which it was intended that the share cropper and the landowner share equally in the compensation paid for cotton plowed up. In the 1933 "plow-up" campaign, however, the share cropper had an investment of the labor which he had expended in the production of the crop, and it seemed natural that he should be compensated for it. The benefit payments under the 1934 contract, on the other hand, were thought of primarily as rental payments for land withdrawn from cultivation, although in equity the share cropper was entitled likewise to compensation for the labor which he was not allowed under the contract to use to the same extent as formerly. The intermediate status of the sharecropper between that of tenant and that of agricultural laborer made it difficult to provide compensation for him.

2/ These figures may be taken as an approximation of the average rental which a landowner would have received before the acreage reduction went into effect. This computation is valid as well for land farmed by share croppers where the landlord receives one-half instead of one-fourth of the cotton. The additional one-fourth which the landlord receives in this case is merely compensation for furnishing seed, fertilizer, work stock and equipment. This additional one-fourth cannot, therefore, be considered in the category of economic rent. According to the 1934 cotton contract, where a farm is operated by a "managing share tenant," a landowner will receive on the average $3.48 per acre on the land withdrawn from cultivation. The landowner also benefits, moreover, from the increased price which he will receive for his share of the cotton grown upon acres which are not withdrawn from cultivation.

When farms are operated by the landowner with the services of share croppers or with tenants who are not classes as "managing share tenants," it is obvious that the landlord is liberally compensated for acreage withdrawn from production. On the basis of an average production of 174 pounds of lint cotton, the landlord will receive $6.96 per acre for the acreage withdrawn from production. 3/ This amount may be compared with the $2.17-1/2, $4.35 or $6.52-1/2 per acre which the landowner would have received if the land had been planted to cotton, if there had been no acreage reduction program, and if the price of cotton had been respectively 5¢, 10¢ or 15¢ per pound. 4/ The landowner thus receives from the Government as payment for the acreage withdrawn from cultivation a sum three times as great as he probably would have received as rent had there been no recovery program. 5/ The landowner also benefits as in the previous case analyzed from the increased price which he will receive for the cotton produced on acreage which is not withdrawn from cultivation.

The share cropper fares differently. If he had been tending 15 acres of cotton with an average production of 174 pounds of cotton per acre, he would have received for his one-half of the cotton produced on these fifteen acres, the sum of $65.25 if cotton had been selling at 5¢ per pound which is approximately the lowest price at which cotton sold during the depression. According to the 1934 cotton contract, the share cropper who formerly produced 15 acres would now produce 9 acres of cotton if the landlord reduced his production 40% ratably among his tenants as

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3/ 4¢ x 174# = $6.96

4/ See Footnote on Pages 10 and 11.

5/ A small fraction of this rental benefit payment might be thought of as compensation for work stock and equipment owned by the landowner which is not employed owing to the reduction in his acreage.

is provided for in the contract. At a price of 10¢ per pound, which is slightly less than the current farm price, the share cropper would receive $78.30 for his one-half of the production of 9 acres. To this must be added $5.22 which the share cropper would receive as a parity payment from the Government. His total cash income would thus be $83.52 which can be compared with the $65.25 which he might have expected to obtain this year if there had been no recovery program. While the percentage of increase in cash income which a share cropper receives is thus far less than that of the landowner, it is nevertheless true that the cash income of the share cropper has not been reduced if the provisions of the contract are actually followed, but is instead increased somewhat. The value of this cash income is reduced to some extent, however, by increases in the price of commodities with which the share cropper is "furnished."

This method of dividing benefit payments between landlords and share croppers and between landlords and share tenants who are not classed as "managing sahre tenants" differs from the method of division of benefit payments in the wheat and corn-hog contracts where few share croppers are involved. It also differs from the method of division used in the tobacco contract by the terms of which the share cropper obtains a part of the rental payments as well as the parity payments. In these contracts the division of the benefit payments between landowners and tenants is in proportion to their interest in the crop. Thus a share cropper in the tobacco contracts receives one-half of the amount of the benefit payments instead of one-ninth as in the case of the cotton contract.

The question naturally arises of why it was that the cotton contract was so drawn that share croppers and a considerable proportion of share tenants receive so much smaller a share of the benefit payments made by the Government in the case of the cotton contract than they do in the case of the other contracts. It was argued in favor of making this striking difference in the division of the rental benefits in the cotton contract that landowners could not be induced to sign the contract if they were not given a larger share of the rental benefits than landlords received in the case of the other acreage reduction contracts. It was argued that the amounts per acre received in the form of rental benefits paid by the Government was less in the case of the cotton contract than in the case of the other acreage reduction contracts and that consequantly a division of these payments in the ratio of eight to one was justified.

It is true that in numbers of cases a farmer who signs both a cotton contract and a tobacco contract receives several times more per acre for land withdrawn from production by the terms of his tobacco contract than he does from his cotton contract. Likewise the average benefit payment per acre in the case of wheat is considerably larger than in the case of cotton. This argument by itself could only mean that the landlord was induced to sign the cotton contract by an inducement obtained at the expense of the share tenant and share cropper. It was further argued however, in favor of the eight to one division of payments that if the tenant received the right to use the acres withdrawn from commercial production for raising food crops, he would be fully compensated.

It was reasoned that if the tenant had received exactly one-half of the benefit payments instead of the one-ninth which he actually receives, he would receive $3.02½ more per acre on the average than he does actually receive according to the terms of the 1934 cotton contract, assuming an average of 6 acres per tenant withdrawn from cultivation. It was contended that the value of these six acres planted to food crops for the use of the tenant would be at least equal to the additional $18.21 which he would have received had the rental benefits been equally divided. The validity of such a computation obviously depends on whether or not the opportunity to use the acres withdrawn from commercial production is actually made effective for the benefit of tenant farmers.

Finally it should be noted that the more favorable the division of benefit payments is to the tenant, the stronger will be the motive for the landlord to reduce the number of his tenants.

In none of the contracts is there any provision for compensating hired laborers for the reduction in opportunity for employment. If a landowner is farming his land with hired laborers there is nothing in the cotton contract which requires him to spread the work over the same number of workers as formerly. Indeed there is nothing in the contract which prevents the landlord from reducing the number of his hired laborers to any extent which he might desire. There are likewise no provisions in the contract affecting the compensation of hired laborers. Consequently, the temptation exists for landlords to replace tenants with day laborers since tenants have some rights in the contract, while laborers do not. The cotton contract as well as the others contains provisions against this practice, however.

The share cropper is also given by the contract the right to use rent-free such of the acres withdrawn from cultivation as may be necessary to produce food for himself and family. Only if this right to use the acres taken out of cotton production is actually made effective, would the share cropper receive a substantial benefit from this provision. If it is made effective, it would be a step in the direction of providing a more wholesome diet for the share cropper and a step away from the system of "furnishing" by the landlord. Efforts are being made by the Agricultural Extension Agents and relief organizations to see to it that tenants are furnished with a means for making use of the acres which are withdrawn from cultivation. The 1934 contract further provides that the landowner must furnish the work stock and implements necessary to the tenant for producing food crops on this acreage in exchange for work by the tenant. The landowner is further obligated not to reduce the number of his tenants and to make the reduction in acreage ratably among his tenants. He has the right to dispense with the services of any tenant who becomes a nuisance or who is a menace to the welfare of the producer". These provisions are simply intended to prevent a reduction in the number of tenants and are not intended to require the landowner to retain exactly the same individuals. Where wood is available on the farm or plantation, the landowner is required to allow the tenant to provide himself with wood for fuel.

III

It is inevitable that with acreage reduction there should be pressure toward reduction in the number of people employed in producing cotton.

As explained above, the cotton contract for 1934 has within it provisions which are intended to prevent this pressure having effect. During the past four or five years the number of former tenant farmers who are without means of livelihood has been steadily increasing. This has been due in part to the steady increase in population in the South, where the birth rate is materially higher than in other parts of the country; to the lack of opportunity for the absorption of this increase in population in industry to the extent it had been prior to the depression; to the return from the city to the country of many families employed in industry before the depression; the use of labor-saving methods of cultivation, and finally to the exhaustion of credit of landowners which has made it impossible for them to finance the same number of tenants as formerly and which has in some instnaces even led to inability to carry on production at all.

Due to these causes there has been accumulating during the past four or five years in the South a steadily increasing number of "squatter" families. These families formerly were able to obtain a crop to tend but are now unable to do so. Many of them are living in tumble-down tenant houses and tobacco barns and any sort of shack which they can find. Their standard of living is appalling and is even much below the customary low standard of living of tenant farmers who are engaged in production. The rehabilitation of these "squatter" families is demanded by every consideration of national responsibility.

Since it could easily be forseen that acreage reduction was going to take place in 1934, some landowners dispensed with the services of tenants prior to signing the 1934 contract. In many cases tenants left farms and plantations as they normally do but when they tried to find employment elsewhere they were unable to find it on account of acreage reduction. Their former landowner naturally did not feel under obligation to take them back after they had left of their own free will. In some cases, too, tenants left the farms and went to nearby towns with the purpose of participating in the benefits of local relief. In many cases these tenant farmers left their former landlord without making any arrangements to return.

At the present time there are reports of displacement of tenants having large families with tenants having small families and of substitution of relatives of the landlord as tenants in place of former tenants. As a result of these various causes the number of idle tenant farmers and agricultural laborers is apparently increasing just as it has done during the past four or five years. It is true that the rate of increase is probably not as great as it would have been if the recovery program had not been undertaken since the exhaustion of the credit resources of landlords would have resulted this year in a very high degree of displacement of tenants. This does not, however, dispose of the unfortunate fact that agricultural unemployment is probably increasing.

Certain measures have been taken by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in conjunction with other agencies of the Government designed to protect the interests and to improve conditions among tenant farmers.

In cooperation with the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, measures are being taken to provide tenant farmers with cows and pigs. This will tend to render more effective the right of the tenant farmer to use acres withdrawn from production to produce foodstuffs for his own use.

The Federal Emergency Relief Administration has instructed its County Directors to ascertain in cooperation with County Agricultural Agents and local Crop Adjustment Committees which landlords, if any, have made a net reduction in the normal number of their tenants and to ascertain the reasons for such reductions. Where such reduction has occurred, the County Directors have been instructed to determine whether the landlords would be willing to have tenants move on their farms. The County Directors have been instructed to provide means of livelihood for the families of tenants when the landlord is unable to "furnish" the tenant. The County Directors have also been instructed to provide the Federal Emergency Relief Administration with the names of landlords with whom it is not possible to make arrangements for employing the normal number of tenants.

The standard of living which results from a situation in which an entire family depends for its income on half of the product of some fifteen acres of cotton cannot be corrected by the present program of acreage reduction. The program was never intended to do so, of course. It is plainly the duty of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, however, to spare no efforts in preventing the unequal distribution of the advantages of the acreage reduction program and particularly to prevent the operation of that program from making the situation of any class of producers worse.

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